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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

**SUBJECT: War and Peace in the Space Age, by Lt. Gen.
James M. Gavin**

1. This book deals with three things: (a) General Gavin's life and military experiences, (b) how the US came to lag behind the Soviets in missile and earth satellite development, and (c) military organization and strategy for the "space age." It goes over ground which is by now pretty familiar from the writings of Henry Kissinger and others. Its relevance to our work is indirect; there is virtually no comment on or discussion of intelligence.

2. The thesis is pretty much as expected: limited war, tactical use of nuclear weapons; air transportability of troops, supplies, weapons. There is a useful discussion of the potentialities of reconnaissance satellites. A chapter on Soviet policy and strategy is orthodox. There are urgings for reform of our military policy, more expenditure, better understanding, and above all for more effort in scientific and technological research and development.

3. The book is not very inflammatory, save perhaps for some harsh remarks about Defense Secretary Wilson, a few acid comments on Defense Department decisions leading to our "missile lag" behind Russia, and some interesting material on the influence of business concerns in determining US weapons expenditures.

4. Two or three particular remarks of interest:

"The manned bomber" will become obsolete as soon as surface-to-air missiles carrying nuclear warheads are on site in numbers. It is important that we realize this is the determinant of the manned bomber's date of obsolescence... not when either side has ICBM's to replace it. The ICBM is the consequence of manned bomber obsolescence, not the cause." page 4

"I have no concern for the defense of Western Europe if nuclear weapons are not used... With all of Western Europe and most of the satellites arrayed against her, I do not think Soviet prospects of conquering Europe by nonatomic means are very bright, and they realize this. The tactical nuclear war is the real danger..." pages 147-8

"...there is a considerable quantity of intelligence to support the view, a view held by a number of people in the intelligence business, that in the competition to develop Long-Range Striking Forces, the Soviets have led us to believe that they were building a sizable long-range bomber force, whereas, in fact, they were investing most of their national product for their long-range forces in long-range ballistic missiles. The Soviets merely built and displayed before Western observers sufficient long-range manned bombers to cause apprehension, and consequent reaction on our part. We in turn embarked upon a very expensive long-range manned bomber program." page 24

5. There is an interesting suggestion for "technological war games", with teams representing nations A and B being given current problems in technology, providing each other with false information, making decisions in the light of information supplied by a control group, etc. (pages 243-245)

6. I attempt no summary of General Gavin's recommendation as to US strategy, save to report that he thinks it a mistake

to station IRBM's in the UK because the UK is too far forward (they should be in southern Europe and Africa); and that he thinks it folly to deprive the West Germans, or any allies, of nuclear weapons. And of course he believes in preparing for limited wars.

7. The book is scheduled for publication on 25 August.

ABBOT E. SMITH